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Comparative Negligence and Dram Shop Laws: Does
Buckley v. Pirolo Sound Last Call for Holding New
Jersey Liquor Vendors Liable for the Torts of
Intoxicated Persons?
At common law, a person injured by an intoxicated individual had
no cause of action against an establishment that had furnished the intoxi-
cated individual with alcoholic beverages.' In response to this some-
times harsh common law rule, many states have enacted statutes that
specifically impose liability on the purveyor of intoxicating beverages in
certain situations. These statutes are commonly referred to as "dram
shop" statutes.
2
Unlike these states, New Jersey has not enacted a dram shop statute
that imposes civil liability on unlawful sellers of alcoholic beverages.
New Jersey does, however, judicially recognize a common law cause of
action against a tavern based on the negligent sale of intoxicating
liquors.3
1 The reason for this common law rule was that the consumption of liquor, and not the selling
of liquor, was considered to be the proximate cause of the alcohol-related injury. This common law
principle was exhibited as early as 1793 in Ashley v. Harrison, I Peake 149, 3 Rev. Rep. 686 (K.B.
1793), where the court dismissed a libel action because it believed the alleged injury was too remote
from the alleged wrongful act. Lord Kenyon stated:
If this action is to be maintained, I know not to what extent the rule can be carried. For
aught I can see to the contrary, it may equally be supported against every man who circu-
lates the glass too freely, and intoxicates an actor, by which he is rendered incapable of
performing his part on the stage.
Id.
This common law rule had arisen from the dual assumptions that a person should not be able to
relieve himself from responsibility for his acts by becoming intoxicated, and that selling liquor to an
able-bodied man should not be a tort because the liquor vending business is legitimate and the
purchaser is deemed to be responsible. See generally W. Prosser, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 32 (4th ed. 1971). See also Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969).
2 Dram shop statutes, also known as "civil damage acts," allow a third party, injured by an
intoxicated person, to bring a civil action against the person who contributed to the intoxication.
Dram shop statutes should be distinguished from liquor control statutes which prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquor to specified individuals, and require either fines or criminal penalties for their
violation. For a general discussion of dram shop legislation, see Comment, Dram Shop Liability-A
Judicial Response, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 995 (1969). See also Comment, Ono v. Applegate: Common Law
Dram Shop Liability, 3 U. HAW. L. REv. 149 (1981).
Sixteen states have dram shop statutes currently in force: ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4,
§ 713 (1974 & Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135-136 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1980-81); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26.683 (West 1975); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West 1978); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1980-
81); N.D. CEr. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1973); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 3-11-1 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West
Supp. 1980-81).
Also, the District of Columbia has a dram shop statute located at D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121
(Supp. 1986).
3 See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). See also ifra note 16 and accompa-
nying text.
With regard to most negligence actions, New Jersey has adopted a
comparative negligence approach for apportioning damages. 4 This ap-
proach eliminates the complete defense of contributory negligence and
apportions damages according to the relative fault of the parties. 5
Such an approach to damages apparently conflicts with New Jersey's
dram shop rule that, at least in principle, imposes strict and absolute lia-
bility upon the negligent commercial seller of alcoholic beverages. The
Supreme Court of NewJersey recently examined this seeming conflict of
New Jersey's Comparative Negligence Act and the state's common law
dram shop rule in Buckley v. Pirolo.6 The court's careful reasoning in
Buckley may have far-reaching implications in New Jersey, and in states
that have not addressed this particular issue.
This note will analyze the conflict between a dram shop rule's impo-
sition of strict and total liability and comparative negligence's fault-based
apportionment of damages. Part I of this note briefly reviews the devel-
opment of New Jersey's common law dram shop rule. Part II examines
New Jersey's Comparative Negligence Act and determines whether the
Act should be applied to all dram shop cases. 7 On a broader level, this
section will also examine how several other states have treated the appar-
ent conflict between a comparative negligence approach to the issue of
damages and a strict liability approach to the question of liability in dram
shop cases. Part III explores the viability of allowing the alternative the-
ory of contributory negligence consisting of an "assumption of the risk"
to dilute or to defeat a tavern's culpability in dram shop cases. Finally,
Part IV concludes that the public policy considerations supporting a
dram shop act and a comparative negligence approach to damages do
not necessarily conflict; in fact, with proper balancing by the courts, all of
the policy concerns can be effectively addressed in dram shop cases.
I. The Development of Dram Shop Liability
A. Historical Development
In order to deter automobile operators from driving while intoxi-
cated and to compensate innocent victims injured by intoxicated individ-
4 N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West 1982). See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying
text.
5 To date, the vast majority of states have adopted some form of comparative negligence.
These forms fall primarily into three basic categories: pure, modified and slight-gross. The
pure form provides for the apportionment of damages between a negligent defendant and a
contributorily negligent plaintiff regardless of the extent to which either party's negligence
contributed to the injury. Under the modified approach, however, while damages are ap-
portioned between the parties, contributory negligence continues to be a complete defense
where a plaintiff's negligence exceeds that of the defendant. Finally, under the slight-gross
form of comparative negligence a plaintiff's contributory negligence will bar his recovery
unless his negligence is slight and/or the defendant's negligence was gross in comparison.
Easterday, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act: How Does It Compare With OtherJurisdictions?, 17 IND. L.
REV. 883 (1984).
6 101 N.J. 68, 500 A.2d 703 (1985). See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
7 For purposes of this note, a "dram shop case" is a case in which an injured third party brings
an action against a liquor vendor that served alcohol to a tortfeasor who was already intoxicated or
who was a minor.
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uals, the majority of state legislatures have enacted "dram shop acts." 8
These statutes impose liability on commercial vendors who supply alco-
holic beverages to minors and to obviously intoxicated persons who in-
jure third parties. Most of these legislatures justify the imposition of
statutory liability by declaring that dram shop acts protect people who
cannot protect themselves.
Many states that have not enacted dram shop statutes have judicially
imposed similar liability on vendors of alcoholic beverages. In these
states, the courts have handled dram shop cases using one of three basic
theories of liability: (1) negligence per se for violations of beverage con-
trol statutes; (2) common law negligence; and (3) pure negligence.
Most state courts have found that violations of beverage control stat-
utes9 result in negligence per se. 10 In these jurisdictions, if a plaintiff
establishes that the defendant violated a beverage control statute, any
inquiry into the standard of care of the defendant is foreclosed. Only the
amount of civil damages remains at issue."'
A few state courts that impose civil liability when a beverage control
statute has been violated have developed common law negligence ac-
tions.1 2 These actions are not based on pure negligence principles;
rather, they are premised on the theory that beverage control statutes
impose a duty on alcohol vendors to protect third persons from intoxi-
cated persons. These courts reason that when a vendor serves an intoxi-
cated person, it breaches this statutory duty of care, and a cause of action
for common law negligence arises.15
8 See supra note 2.
9 NewJersey's beverage control statute, Regulation No. 20, Rule 1, Division of Alcoholic Con-
trol, New Jersey (1967) states that:
No licensee shall sell, serve or deliver or allow, permit or suffer the sale, service or delivery
of any alcoholic beverage, directly or indirectly, to any person under the age of twenty-one
(2 1) years or to any person actually or apparently intoxicated, or allow, permit or suffer the
consumption of any alcoholic beverage by any such person in or upon the licensed prem-
ises. (footnote omitted).
The statutory authority for the regulation is NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 3361-69 (West Supp. 1971-72). See
Galvin v.Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 17 n.7 (3d Cir. 1961) (New Jersey alcohol beverage control (ABC)
regulations have the same effect as a statute in establishing the standard of care); Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn, Inc., 46 NJ. 582, 590, 218 A.2d 630, 635 (1966) (ABC regulations have the same effect
as a statute designed to protect incompetents against consequences of their own incompetency);
Cino v. Driscoll, 130 NJ.L. 535, 538-40, 34 A.2d 6, 9 (1943) (the commissioner of the alcoholic
beverages commission has the power to promulgate regulations having the force and effect of a
statute).
10 See, e.g., Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973) (tavern furnished alcohol
to minors in violation of the beverage control statute); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So.2d 213
(Miss. 1979) (store furnished alcohol to minors in violation of the beverage control statute).
I I See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
12 See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322, 324-26 (7th Cir. 1959) (com-
mon law negligence action existed under a duty imposed by the alcoholic beverage control statute);
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. 188, 195, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959) (vendors served a minor in violation of
the beverage control statutes that created a duty to the general public); Lopez v. May, 98 N.M. 625,
651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (tavern owner served an intoxicated patron in violation of the beverage con-
trol statutes that created a duty to the general public); Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d
893 (1977) (tavern owner who sold intoxicants to an intoxicated woman in violation of a penal stat-
ute owed a duty to the traveling public).
13 Courts usually prefer to recognize common law negligence actions rather than strict negli-
gence per se actions because the actions based on the latter theory place presumptions of negligence
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Finally, a substantial number of state courts impose liability based
solely on the fundamental principles of negligence. 14 These courts rec-
ognize that an individual owes a duty to others when his or her act cre-
ates a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to third parties. In
these jurisdictions, a plaintiff can demonstrate that the alcohol vendor
was negligent by showing that when the vendor furnished alcohol to a
minor or an intoxicated person it knew that the drinker would then drive
on public highways. Such an act is negligent because a reasonable per-
son should know that supplying alcohol to a minor or to an intoxicated
person under such circumstances is likely to cause injury to third
parties. 15
New Jersey adheres to the second approach and imposes dram shop
liability under the.principles of common law negligence. Thus, when a
vendor violates the New Jersey beverage control statutes, it breaches its
statutory duty of care and can be found negligent if this violation caused
damage to an innocent third party.
B. Development in New Jersey
In the seminal case, Rappaport v. Nichols, 16 New Jersey established its
dram shop rule and based the rule on principles of common law negli-
gence. In Rappaport, several taverns served alcoholic beverages to an in-
toxicated minor. After driving away from the last tavern, the minor's car
collided with another car. The driver of the other car, Arthur Rappaport,
died from injuries received in the collision. Rappaport's widow sued one
of the taverns, alleging that the tavern had negligently served alcohol to
the minor and, therefore, had proximately caused or contributed to her
husband's death. 1
7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that a
tavernkeeper who serves alcoholic beverages when he knows or should
have known that the patron is intoxicated may be liable for having cre-
ated an unreasonable risk of harm to third parties.' 8 Thus, the
tavernkeeper had engaged in negligent conduct upon which a plaintiff
could ground a common law claim for damages. The high court further
noted that the tavernkeeper may be held liable for the injuries that result
in the ordinary course of events from his negligent conduct if his conduct
is a "substantial factor" in bringing about those injuries.' 9
In contrast to the situation found in Rappaport, the plaintiff-patron's
representative in Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc. ,20 sued a tavern for inju-
on vendors. See Easterday, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act: How Does It Compare With Other Jurisdic-
tions?, 17 IND. L. REv. 883 (1984).
14 See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153-54, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534, 539 (1978).
15 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, n.27 (4th ed. 1971). The third party
plaintiffcan establish causation if he can show that the accident would not have occurred but for the
intoxication.
16 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
17 Id. at 192-93, 156 A.2d at 3-4.
18 Id. at 202-03, 156 A.2d at 9.
19 Id. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9.
20 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
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ries resulting from the patron's own negligence while he was intoxicated.
On the day he died, John Soronen began drinking in the early morning at
a tavern near his home. Later that same day, Soronen moved to the Olde
Milford Inn and continued his drinking. When Soronen attempted to
leave his bar stool, he fell and struck his head against a steel column. He
died of a fractured skull later that night. His widow brought a wrongful
death action against the tavern, and the tavern countered that the plain-
tiff's decedent had been contributorily negligent. 21
The Supreme Court of NewJersey adhered to the Restatement posi-
tion of protecting persons unable to protect themselves and found that
the defense of contributory negligence does not apply where the defend-
ants violate a statute enacted "to protect a class of persons from their
inability to exercise protective care." 22 The court noted that the tavern's
acknowledged duty not to serve intoxicated persons protects the individ-
ual as well as the public at large.23 This duty, according to the court
below, "would be rendered meaningless.., if a tavernkeeper could avoid
responsibility by claiming that it was the [plaintiff's] own fault if he drank
too much."
24
In a slightly different context, a New Jersey court has held that con-
tributory negligence is also unavailable as a defense where a third party,
injured by an intoxicated bar patron, brings a negligence action against a
tavern. In Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill Corporation,25 Alita Aliulis and other mi-
nors had been drinking heavily before entering the Tunnel Hill Tavern.
In the early hours of the morning, Aliulis left the tavern in a car driven by
Cynthia Zulauf, another minor. Aliulis and the two other passengers in
the vehicle knew that Zulauf was not fit to drive the car because she was
intoxicated. After stopping for gasoline, Zulauf drove only a short dis-
tance before colliding with another car. Zulauf was killed and her three
passengers were seriously injured. The three passengers brought a suit
against the Tunnel Hill Tavern, alleging negligence.
Relying on the Soronen case, the Superior Court of New Jersey held
that a defendant could not assert contributory negligence as a defense
where the plaintiff was effectively forced to ride with the intoxicated
driver in order to get home.26 The court found that because of the rural
location of the tavern and the fact that the crash occurred at three a.m.,
the plaintiff had no real choice but to ride with the intoxicated driver in
order to get home. The court stated, however, that it was "not ... pre-
pared to say that in no case may the contributory negligence of an in-
jured third party defeat his action against a seller of alcoholic beverages
21 46 N.J. at 584, 218 A.2d at 631. Contributory negligence consists of an act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the complaining party, which, concurring with
defendant's negligence, is a proximate cause of the injury. Traditionally, a finding that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent barred him from any recovery. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 538 (5th ed.
1979).
22 Soronen, 46 N.J. at 587, 218 A.2d at 635 (referring to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 483 comment a (1965)).
23 46 N.J. at 589, 218 A.2d at 636.
24 Soronen, 84 N.J. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208 (1964).
25 114 N.J. Super. 205, 275 A.2d 751, af'd., 59 N.J. 508, 284 A.2d 180 (1971).
26 59 N.J. at 511, 284 A.2d at 182.
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NOTES
to underage or intoxicated persons." 27
Thus, when New Jersey was still a contributory negligence state, the
New Jersey courts refused to apply the defense of contributory negli-
gence to dram shop cases in two situations. One such situation arose
when the defendants violated a statute designed to protect a class of per-
sons who could not protect themselves and the plaintiff was a member of
that defenseless class. The second situation developed when a plaintiff
was unable to get home unless she accepted a ride with an intoxicated
driver. The Superior Court of New Jersey did note during this time pe-
riod, however, that in some circumstances contributory negligence might
be a valid defense.
Because New Jersey has adopted the Comparative Negligence Act 28
subsequent to these older decisions, it may now be possible to assert the
defense of contributory negligence successfully in a dram shop case.
Under the Comparative Negligence Act, a plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence diminishes but does not totally bar his recovery. Considering this
new legislative guidepost for determining damages in negligence actions,
the New Jersey courts may be more willing to allow this defense.
II. The Doctrine of Comparative Negligence
A. Historical Development
Perhaps no rule of the common law has been more widely accepted
and criticized than the general rule of contributory negligence.29 It is
generally recognized that contributory negligence with its all-or-nothing
approach to recovery has denied justice to more injured persons than
any other legal concept.30
Because of the harshness of the contributory negligence rule, states
began to search for a more equitable approach to apportioning damages.
One of the first jurisdictions to do so was Florida in its leading case of
Hoffman v. Jones.3 1 In Hoffman, the court reasoned that the initial justifica-
tion for the contributory negligence rule-to protect the essential growth
of industries, particularly transportation-was no longer valid.3 2 The
court stated that because modem economic and social customs favor the
individual and not industry, it was the role of the judiciary to modify this
outdated judicially created common law rule.33
27 Aliulis, 59 NJ. at 511, 284 A.2d at 182.
28 See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L.
REV. 138 n.1 (1958); Annotation, The Doctrine of Comparative Negligence and Its Relation to the Doctrine of
Contributory Negligence, 32 A.L.R. 3d 463-88 (1970).
30 Heft & Heft, The Two-Layer Cake: No Fault and Comparative Negligence, 58 A.B.A. 933, 936
(1972).
31 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
32 Id. at 437.
33 The contemporary conditions must be met with contemporary standards which are realis-
tic and better calculated to obtain justice among all of the parties involved based upon the
circumstances applying between them at the time in question. The rule of contributory
negligence as a complete bar to recovery was imported into law by judges. Whatever may
have been the historical justification of it, today it is almost universally regarded as unjust
and inequitable to vest an entire accidental loss on one of the parties whose negligent con-
duct combined with the negligence of the other party to produce the loss. If fault is to
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Today, a majority ofjurisdictions have adopted a comparative negli-
gence standard.3 4 The doctrine of comparative negligence developed in
response to the competing policies of compensating victims of negli-
gence and making individuals responsible for their own safety. 35 The
comparative negligence approach accommodates these policies by elimi-
nating the complete defense of contributory negligence and by appor-
tioning damages according to the relative fault of the parties.
36
B. The Comparative Negligence Act of New Jersey
Following the majority trend, New Jersey in 1973 rejected the
doctrine of contributory negligence and adopted its Comparative Negli-
gence Act.37 The Act provides that in any negligence action, contribu-
remain the test of liability, then the doctrine of comparative negligence, which involves
apportionment of the loss among those whose fault contributed to the occurrence, is more
consistent with liability based on a fault premise.
Id. at 436.
34 Thirty-two states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have now enacted comparative negli-
gence statutes:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2505 to -2509 (Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765
(Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h
(West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp.
1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (Supp. 1983); IND. CODE §§ 34-4-33-1 to -8 (Supp. 1983),
amended by Act of Mar. 5, 1984 at IND. CODE §§ 34-4-33-1 to -13 (Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 60-
2585 to -2586 (1976); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 156 (Supp. 1983-84); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 85 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983-84); MINN STAT.
§ 604.01-02 (Supp. 1984); MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (Supp. 1983); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-702
to -703 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41,141 (Supp. 1981); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507; 7-a (Supp. 1983); NJ. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (Supp. 1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson Supp. 1982-83); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14 (West
Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. § 18-470 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1983-
84); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4-4.1 (Supp. 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-9-2 (Supp. 1983); TEx. [Civ. PRAc. & REM.] CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp.
1983); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.005-.920 (Supp.
1984-85); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895-045 (West Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1983).
Ten states have adopted the comparative negligence approach through judicial action. See Kaatz
v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 II. 2d 1, 421
N.E.2d 886 (1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d
713 (Ky. 1984); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977); Gustafson v. Benda, 661
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979).
The following states have not yet adopted a comparative negligence approach to damages: Ala-
bama, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.
35 For a general discussion of comparative negligence, see Comment, Comparative Negligence, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1668 (1983).
36 To avoid confusion, it should be noted that comparative negligence statutes merely measure
the weight that shall be accorded to a plaintiff's contributory negligence when determining damages
instead of deeming such negligence a full bar to recovery.
37 New Jersey's Comparative Negligence Act provides, in relevant part:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal rep-
resentative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought or was not greater than the combined negligence of the persons
against whom recovery is sought. Any damages sustained shall be diminished by the per-
centage sustained of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West 1982).
In 1982, this act was amended in order to overrule the individual approach to apportioning
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tory negligence of the plaintiff shall not act as a complete bar to recovery
if such negligence was not greater than the combined negligence of the
defendants. Thus, as long as the defendants are more negligent than the
plaintiff,38 the plaintiff may still recover a portion of his damages.
The Act does not explicitly explain how it should be applied to a
dram shop case or to any action based on strict liability. The legislative
histories of the original act,3 9 its amendment4° and the Governor's Re-
consideration and Recommendation Statement 41 also provide no assis-
tance when determining how the Act should affect dram shop actions.
Consequently, the courts of New Jersey have had to analyze this issue
without legislative direction.
C. The Interaction of New Jersey's Comparative Negligence Act
With the Common Law Dram Shop Rules
In Buckley v. Pirolo, 42 the Supreme Court of New Jersey analyzed for
the first time how the state's Comparative Negligence Act interacts with
the common law dram shop rule. The court determined that application
of the Comparative Negligence Act to dram shop cases does not neces-
sarily conflict with the public policy considerations supporting the dram
shop rule. The court believed that this was especially true where the
plaintiff in a dram shop case has assumed the risk of his actions. 43
In Buckley, Charles Reidinger and Charles Pirolo drank several bot-
tles of beer and shots of whiskeywith their employer at the Forked River
House tavern after work. At two p.m., the trio went to a friend's house
and drank some more beer. Around four p.m., Pirolo and Reidinger re-
turned to the Forked River House tavern and met several friends. After
consuming more alcoholic beverages, the group went for a ride on a
plane piloted by Pirolo. During the flight, the plane buzzed over the bar
several times at low altitudes.
44
After this initial flight, the men returned to the bar where Pirolo con-
sumed another two bottles of beer. Pirolo then decided to pilot a second
flight with Reidinger and two other friends as passengers. One of the
passengers, Roseann Buckley, had not consumed any alcohol that day.
On the second flight, the aircraft struck a tower near the tavern and
damages as used in Van Horn v. William Blanchard Co., 173 NJ. Super 280,414 A.2d 265, aff'd, 88
NJ. 91, 438 A.2d 552 (1980). An "individual approach" allows the plaintiffin a negligence action to
recover only from those defendants who were more negligent than plaintiff, even if in the aggregate
his negligence was less than the defendants' total percentage. An "aggregate approach" allows the
plaintiff in a negligence action to recover damages in any case in which his negligence is less than or
equal to the combined negligence of multiple defendants.
38 In other words, if the fact finder determines that the relative fault of the defendant was fifty-
one percent or more, the plaintiff may still recover damages.
39 Act of May 24, ch. 146, 1973 NJ. Laws 300.
40 Act of Dec. 6, ch. 191, 1982 NJ. Laws 786.
41 In the Governor's Statement, Governor Kean endorsed the change in the comparative negli-
gence law. He based the endorsement on his belief that the policy of allocating responsibility among
all negligent parties in proportion to their relative fault is more fully achieved under the aggregate
approach. Senate No. 215-L. 1982, c. 191.
42 101 NJ. 68, 500 A.2d 703 (1985).
43 Id. at 78, 500 A.2d at 708.
44 Id. at 71, 500 A.2d at 705.
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crashed, killing everyone aboard.45
The personal representatives of the three passengers who were
killed in the airplane crash brought wrongful death actions against the
pilot, the lessor of the aircraft and the tavern. Although the jury found
that the passengers in the tavern had been contributorily negligent, the
trial court molded its verdict so that the tavern would not benefit from its
patrons' negligence.
46
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey reversed and re-
manded. 47 The appellate court found that the Comparative Negligence
Act could be applied to dram shop cases, but expressly limited its deci-
sion to the particular facts of Buckley. 48 The court found that the dram
shop rule essentially protects intoxicated persons and third persons who,
under the circumstances, cannot protect themselves.
49
The court also distinguished the facts of Buckley from those found in
the Aliulis case. Unlike the situation in Aliulis, the court believed that the
defense of contributory negligence could be successfully asserted be-
cause "the flight was not the sole means of transportation" available to
the injured plaintiffs.50 The court continued: "Indeed, it was not their
transportation at all. Their decision to fly with an intoxicated pilot was
voluntarily undertaken by persons whose judgments were not proven to
have been impaired." 51 Therefore, because under the circumstances the
passengers were not forced to accept a ride on the plane, the court re-
fused to apply the dram shop rule and hold the tavern liable for the pas-
sengers' injuries. Because the passengers were not intoxicated, they had
the capacity and legal duty to protect themselves from the harm that
Pirolo might cause in his intoxicated condition.52
The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with the appellate court's
application of the Comparative Negligence Act to a dram shop case.
53
Nonetheless, the high court of New Jersey reversed and remanded the
case because the jury had determined the relative fault of the parties in
the case without properly considering the issue of contributory
negligence. 54
On the fourth day of the trial, the trial court ruled that the defense of
the passengers' negligence would not be available to the tavern even
though it was available to the other defendants. 55 Thus, the court fore-
45 Id.
46 Even though the jury found Buckley, Reidinger and Elms collectively more negligent than
Forked River House, it allowed plaintiffs to recover. This holding was inconsistent with the "aggre-
gate" approach to damages imposed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.1 (West 1982).
47 190 N.J. Super. at 500, 464 A.2d at 1141.
48 Id. at 499, 464 A.2d at 1140.
49 Id. at 498, 464 A.2d at 1140.
50 Id. at 498-99, 464 A.2d 1141.
51 Id. at 498, 464 A.2d at 1145. See also Petrone v. Margolis, 20 N.J. Super. 180, 89 A.2d 476
(1952) (plaintiff denied recovery because she voluntarily assumed the risk of riding in a motor vehi-
cle operated by a driver who was under the influence of intoxicating liquor).
52 190 N.J. Super. at 498, 464 A.2d at 1140.
53 101 N.J. at 71, 500 A.2d at 704.
54 Id. at 74, 500 A.2d at 709 ("The fact remains that when the jury made its determination as to
the respective percentages of negligence as between the passengers and the tavern, it did so without
the issue having been fully unfolded and thoroughly argued.").
55 Id. at 72, 500 A.2d at 705.
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dosed defendant Forked River House from attempting to persuade the
jury that plaintiffs' decedents were negligent. Conversely, plaintiffs also
had no chance to focus on the passengers' freedom from negligence with
respect to the tavern. The New Jersey Supreme Court found this ruling
of the trial court to be a misapplication of the then-existing law.
Therefore, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the cases had
to go back to trial on the issue of the passengers' negligence as compared
to the tavern's negligence 5 6 The court reasoned that the parties should
be permitted to present their cases in the context of what the law is-
including the tavern's defense of the passengers' negligence-rather
than as the trial court misunderstood the law to be.
57
D. The Interaction in Other Jurisdictions of Comparative Negligence
with Dram Shop Rules
Other than the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Buckley
v. Pirolo, case law interpretations of the interaction between comparative
negligence and dram shop acts are rare. Only two other jurisdictions
have remotely addressed the issue, and both courts have inadequately
explained their decisions.
In Danielson v. Johnson,58 the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
the trial court should have allowed the jury to consider plaintiff's negli-
gence when apportioning damages in a dram shop case. In Danielson, a
passenger in a car driven by an intoxicated individual was injured in an
automobile accident. The passenger brought a negligence action against
the driver and a dram shop action against the liquor store and the hosts
of the party at which the driver had been served alcohol. 59
During the six months prior to the accident, the driver and the pas-
senger had established a pattern of attending beer drinking parties to-
gether. On the night of the accident, the passenger not only purchased
six cans of beer for the driver, but also knew that the driver had bought a
glass that had entitled him to an unlimited supply of beer at a party they
attended. Based on this knowledge and on past experience, the passen-
ger knew that the driver had consumed at least three beers before the
fateful ride. Consequently, the court believed the passenger knew or
should have known that the driver was intoxicated on the night he was
injured.60
Based on these facts, the appellate court affirmed ajury finding that
placed 12.5 percent of the fault on the passenger. The court did not set
forth its rationale for allowing the jury to find the passenger compara-
tively negligent. The court did not mention Minnesota's Comparative
Negligence Act6' or its interaction with the state's dram shop act. Be-
56 Id. at 79, 500 A.2d at 709.
57 Id.
58 366 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. App. 1985).
59 Id. at 312.
60 Id. at 313.
61 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604.01-.02 (West Supp. 1984) provides in relevant part:
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representa-
tive to recover damages for fault resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the
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cause the court discussed in detail the passenger's knowledge of the
driver's drunkenness, however, the court presumably believed that the
passenger had voluntarily assumed the risk of being injured by the intox-
icated patron's conduct. This Minnesota case implicitly recognizes that if
a dram shop asserts a defense of assumption of the risk in a dram shop
case, a jury may properly consider the comparative fault of the plaintiff
and may reduce his recovery accordingly.
62
Thus, both the Minnesota court in Danielson and the New Jersey
court in Buckley allowed the tavern to assert the defense of comparative
negligence because the passengers in both cases had voluntarily assumed
the risk of the intoxicated patron's conduct. In both cases, the passen-
gers had observed the intoxicated driver drinking heavily and neverthe-
less proceeded to accept their last fateful ride.
In another recent dram shop case, the Superior Court of Connecti-
cut refused to hold a motorist injured by an intoxicated patron contribu-
torily negligent. In Sanders v. Officer's Club of Connecticut,63 William
Sanders rode in a friend's pick-up truck which towed Sanders' car. The
driver of the truck stopped the truck to examine the hitch of the vehicle.
While Sanders inspected the back end of the truck, a car driven by an
intoxicated motorist collided with the rear of Sanders' car. Sanders' car
then slammed into the pickup truck, killing Sanders and severely injuring
his friend. 64
In Sanders' friend's dram shop action against the tavern that had
served the intoxicated driver, the Connecticut court held that the tavern
could not successfully assert contributory negligence as a defense. 65 The
court believed that Sanders' injured friend had not voluntarily assumed
the risk because Sanders and his friend had placed emergency lighting
devices around both Sanders' car and the pickup truck. A responsible
driver, the court reasoned, clearly could have seen the two cars and easily
could have avoided them.6
6
As in the Aliulis case, 67 the Sanders court did not say that assumption
of the risk could never be an acceptable defense in a dram shop action.
The court stated:
A defense that a plaintiff seeking recovery upon the ground of negli-
gence assumed the risk of the situation which brought about the injury
is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance; the defendant
may admit his own negligence and the plaintiff's lack of contributory
negligence and will claim that he is not liable on this ground. As we
have already noted the gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action is
not negligence or wanton misconduct but rather violation of [Con-
contributory fault was not greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault
attributable to the person recovering.
62 Danielson, 366 N.W.2d at 314.
63 196 Conn. 341, 493 A.2d 184 (1985).
64 Id. at 344, 493 A.2d at 187.
65 Id. at 348, 493 A.2d at 191.
66 Id. at 349, 493 A.2d at 192.
67 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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necticut's dram shop act].68
The Sanders court's bar of the defense of comparative negligence can
be distinguished from the Buckley court's allowance of the defense on two
grounds. First, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that applica-
tion of the New Jersey dram shop rule "is not the imposition of strict
liability upon the tavern keeper. The burden upon the plaintiff to
demonstrate negligence and proximate cause remains."' 69 In Buckley,
plaintiffs did not base the cause of action on a statutory violation of a
dram shop act as in Sanders; rather, they premised the action on common
law negligence principles. The Buckley court properly allowed the de-
fense of contributory negligence because plaintiffs based the action on
negligence and not absolute liability.
Second, the Superior Court of Connecticut in Sanders decided that
the doctrine of assumption of the risk did not apply because defendant
could not prove that plaintiff was aware of the intoxicated condition of
the driver that struck him.70 In contrast, the defendant tavern in Buckley
presented the jury with facts demonstrating that the passengers in
Pirolo's airplane were aware of their pilot's intoxicated state. This
awareness characterized their decision to ride on the plane as a voluntary
and reasoned choice. Therefore, unlike the unknowing plaintiffs in Sand-
ers, the passengers in Buckley assumed the risk of their actions and the
court permitted the defense of contributory negligence.7 1
III. The Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk: Should It Be
a Valid Defense in a Dram Shop Case?
The majority in Buckley permitted the defense of contributory negli-
gence because it believed the passengers had assumed the risk of flying
in a plane piloted by an intoxicated individual. Consequently, the contin-
ued viability of the doctrine of assumption of the risk in light of the ac-
ceptance of comparative negligence must be examined.
The jurisdictions that have considered whether the doctrine of as-
sumption of the risk should be retained as a complete defense under a
comparative negligence system have reached divergent conclusions.
When enacting their respective comparative negligence statutes, some
jurisdictions72 evidently anticipated this problem and expressly merged
the doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. 73
68 196 Conn. at 349, 493 A.2d at 192. Like NewJersey, Connecticut has enacted a comparative
negligence statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1984). Unlike NewJersey, how-
ever, Connecticut has adopted a dram shop statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975),
rather than a common law negligence dram shop rule. The policy considerations behind either
approach are identical.
69 114 NJ. Super. at 210, 275 A.2d at 753.
70 Sanders, 196 Conn. at 349, 493 A.2d at 192.
71 Assuming that on remand defendants can show that the passengers on Pirolo's plane were not
intoxicated and that they knew of their pilot's drunken condition, the defense of contributory negli-
gence should prove successful.
72 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1763 (1979); N.Y. Civ. PRc. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976)
(comparative negligence statutes that have expressly merged the doctrines of assumption of the risk
and contributory negligence).
73 The primary reason for merging assumption of the risk with contributory negligence is that it
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Other jurisdictions for the most part have reached the same result by
judicially merging assumption of the risk with contributory negligence.
74
When assumption of the risk is merged into contributory negligence, it
no longer operates as a separate total defense but is recognized as a sep-
arate species of contributory negligence. Thus, in jurisdictions that have
merged the two concepts, if a plaintiff assumes the risk of his conduct, his
award will merely be diminished and not totally barred.
Instead of merging the two defenses, several jurisdictions have statu-
torily abolished the doctrine of assumption of the risk.75 In other juris-
dictions, the courts have concluded that abolition was necessary to
effectuate their state legislature's intent in enacting comparative negli-
gence statutes. 76 Unlike in merger states in which assumption of the risk
is still recognized as a viable, though not an absolute defense, states that
have abolished the concept no longer recognize it as an independent
defense.
77
Finally, when apportioning fault under their respective comparative
negligence statutes, a few jurisdictions have totally rejected the notion of
merger or abolition and have retained assumption of the risk as a com-
plete defense. 78 In these jurisdictions, a successful defense of plaintiff's
assumption of the risk still totally bars recovery, despite the jurisdictions'
adoption of comparative negligence.
would be inequitable to apportion fault when a plaintiff has been contributorily negligent on the one
hand, and yet, on the other hand, to bar recovery when a plaintiff has assumed a known risk. See
Easterday, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act: How Does it Compare With Other Jurisdictions?, 17 IND. L.
REV. 883 (1984).
74 See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 805, 824-25, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 872-73 (1975); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 293 (Fla. 1977). Merging assumption of the
risk into contributory negligence was accomplished by including the doctrine of assumption of the
risk within the definition of the abandoned approach of contributory negligence.
Assumption of the risk can be separated into two general categories: express and implied. Ex-
press assumption of the risk occurs when a plaintiff expressly agrees by contract or otherwise to
accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965). Implied assumption of the risk occurs when a plaintiff does not
expressly agree to assume a risk of harm, but he fully understands the risk of harm and voluntarily
chooses to enter or remain within the area of that risk. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C
(1965).
As noted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Explanatory Notes § 496A comment c(4) (1965):
The same conduct on the part of the plaintiff may then amount to both assumption of the
risk and contributory negligence and may subject him to both defenses. His conduct in
accepting the risk may be unreasonable and thus negligent because the damage is all out of
proportion to the interest he is seeking to advance as where he consents to ride with a
drunkard driver in an unlighted car on a dark night, or dashes into a burning building to
save his hat.
75 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 85
(West Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (1977).
76 See, e.g., Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976); Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101 (N.D.
1974); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979).
77 See Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 507, 610 P.2d 668, 687 (1980) ("We
will follow the modern trend and treat assumption of the risk like any other form of contributory
negligence and apportion it under the comparative negligence statute.").
78 See, e.g., Yankey v. Battle, 122 Ga. App. 275, 176 S.E.2d 714 (1970); Blum v. Brichacek, 191
Neb. 457, 215 N.W.2d 888 (1974); Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. 406, 92 N.W.2d 654 (1958). The
argument supporting retention of the separate defense of assumption of the risk is that such a de-
fense is not based on fault but on knowledge and consent. Consequently, apportioning damages
purely on the basis of fault is not appropriate. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.3
(1974). See also Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977).
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New Jersey has judicially merged the defense of assumption of the
risk and contributory negligence.7 9 In an ordinary negligence action,
plaintiff's assumption of the risk is subsumed under the general category
of contributory negligence. In a strict liability tort action, however, New
Jersey courts recognize a species of assumption of the risk as a defense.8 0
According to the Supreme Court of NewJersey, the defense of contribu-
tory negligence in a strict liability case will be recognized only when the
plaintiff has voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a
known risk, i.e., the plaintiff has impliedly assumed the risk of its con-
duct.8 1 Following this reasoning, courts can apply the Comparative Neg-
ligence Act to strict liability actions in those narrowly defined cases in
which the plaintiff's conduct may be found to constitute contributory
negligence.8 2 Therefore, in tort actions in New Jersey, a defense of con-
tributory negligence based on assumption of the risk will not totally bar
recovery but will simply reduce the amount of a plaintiff's recovery.
In Buckley, the court referred to contributory negligence only in the
context of assumption of the risk. In limited circumstances such as those
in Buckley, in which the defendant asserts assumption of the risk as a par-
tial defense to a common law dram shop negligence action, the court
should allow the defense. In such a situation, the plaintiff is only denied
the protection of the dram shop statute because he fully understood the
risk involved and still chose to assume the risk. Further, assumption of
the risk is not a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery, but merely a form
of contributory negligence to be used in apportioning fault.
IV. The Allowance of the Defense of Contributory Negligence
in Dram Shop Cases: Policy Considerations
In the Buckley decision, public policy concerns justified allowing an
assumption of the risk defense to New Jersey's dram shop rule because
the rule is based on principles of common law negligence. In contrast,
public policy concerns do not warrant allowing contributory negligence
as a defense where defendant does not aver that plaintiff voluntarily as-
sumed the risk of injury.
Regardless of how statutes impose liability on alcohol vendors in
dram shop cases, the policy behind imposing liability is the same.83 A
state-conferred privilege, and not a guaranteed right, allows liquor licen-
sees to operate their businesses. State liquor control regulations make it
illegal for these licensees to serve minors and visibly intoxicated persons.
Such regulations are designed to protect the general public as well as
minors and intoxicated persons. However, when the protected class un-
79 See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 NJ. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), rev'don other grounds,
81 NJ. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
80 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 For a general discussion of the public policy considerations underlying dram shop statutes
and provisions, see Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors, Employers and Social Hosts for Torts of the
Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1013 (1983).
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derstands the risk of harm that they are being shielded from and yet still
chooses to encounter this risk, they should not be held totally blameless.
State legislatures and courts believe it is more equitable to impose
the cost of alcohol-related accidents on those profiting from the sale of
alcoholic beverages rather than on those innocent third parties who were
injured in the accidents. The legislatures and courts justify their position
by noting that commercial vendors of alcoholic beverages: (1) can
purchase extensive liability insurance to bear such losses; (2) can most
equitably spread the cost of insurance by increasing the prices of alco-
holic beverages; (3) have expertise in judging whether a person or a mi-
nor is intoxicated; and (4) can most directly control its patrons'
consumption of alcoholic beverages.
84
While this "deep pocket" analysis has been accepted and applied in
many situations other than those involving dram shop liability, it cannot
always be justified. Simply because commercial vendors can capably
guard against injuries to innocent persons by intoxicated individuals
does not mean that courts and legislatures should automatically thrust
such liability on them. The courts and legislatures should note that if a
member of the protected class chooses not to accept the protection af-
forded him, he must accept the possible disastrous consequences of such
a decision. Although courts should not completely abolish recovery,
under these circumstances courts should diminish recovery to some
degree.
This deviation from the "deep pocket" theory should only be ap-
plied when the member of the protected class is capable of making an
informed choice. Incompetents, who are legally incapable of making in-
formed choices, should continue to receive the statutory protections of
dram shop rules. These protections are designed to guard incompetents
from the possible consequences of their incompetency, regardless of
whether they voluntarily encounter a known risk. Statutory prohibitions
against child labor, the sale of firearms to minors, and hazardous work-
places8 5 would be rendered meaningless if defendants were allowed to
assert contributory negligence as a defense. The primary purpose of
such statutes is to ensure that the protected class will have recourse
against those who exploit and expose them to unnecessary risks. Buck-
ley's limited erosion of the strict liability protection afforded to protected
persons in dram shop cases will not defeat this primary purpose. Only
those members of the protected class who are capable of rejecting the
protection afforded them will, through diminished recovery, be held re-
sponsible for their decisions.
84 Id. at 1015. See also Comment, Comparative Negligence, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1668 (1983).
85 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 (1965) discusses these statutes in the following
manner:
There are exceptional statutes which are intended to place the entire responsibility for
the harm which has occurred upon the defendant. A statute may be found to have that
purpose particularly where it is enacted in order to protect a certain class of persons against
their own inability to protect themselves.
One example of these exceptional statutes, according to the Restatement, is a "Dram Shop Act
(prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages to a visibly intoxicated patron)." Id. See also Majors v.
Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
[Vol. 62:238
NOTES
Because most comparative negligence statutes apply to any negli-
gence action, 6 state legislatures and courts could theoretically extend
the coverage of comparative negligence statutes to dram shop actions
and to other actions traditionally viewed as "exceptional." Other excep-
tional actions involve matters such as child labor, the purchase of fire-
arms, and worker's compensation.
Following such reasoning, most jurisdictions have recently applied
comparative negligence principles to strict products liability actions.8 7
These states have also allowed the defense of contributory negligence in
cases commonly involving strict liability such as dog bite cases 8 and
worker's compensation cases.8 9 Like the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in Buckley v. Pirolo, however, most of these state courts have applied com-
parative negligence principles only where the plaintiff voluntarily and un-
reasonably proceeded to encounter a known risk.
New Jersey courts have followed this trend and have applied com-
parative negligence principles to products liability cases. 90 The New
Jersey courts have specifically held that, although the Comparative Negli-
gence Act may apply to strict liability cases, the Act will only apply when
the plaintiff unreasonably and voluntarily exposes himself to a known
risk.91 Thus, since courts have traditionally viewed both dram shop and
products liability cases as strict liability cases, tavern owners should also
be able to assert comparative negligence as a defense when the plaintiff
assumed the risk of the intoxicant's conduct.
A conditional application of a comparative negligence statute to
dram shop cases does not undermine the purposes of the statute or the
dram shop act or rule. Comparative negligence statutes accommodate
86 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1982) states that the comparative negligence act is applica-
ble "in any action ... to recover damages for negligence."
87 For case law interpretations, see Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979)
(applying the law of the Virgin Islands); McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.
1979) (applying Puerto Rican law); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1976)
(applying Mississippi law); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.C.
Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho Law); Austin v. Raybestos Manhatten, Inc., [1983-84 Transfer Binder]
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9924 (Jan. 17, 1984); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc.,
555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast
Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1983); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454
N.E.2d 197 (1983); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Busch v. Busch
Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 119 N.H. 457, 404 A.2d
1094 (1979); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Day v.
General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984); Wilson v. B.F. Goodrich, 292 Or. 626, 642
P.2d 644 (1982); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Dippel v. Sciano, 37
Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
For statutory interpretations, see ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-163 to -1765 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-406 (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 600.2949 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 4.22.005-.015 (Supp. 1983-84).
88 See, e.g., Arbegast v. Board of Educ., 65 N.Y.2d 161, 490 N.Y.S.2d 751, 480 N.E.2d 365
(1985); Allgeyer v. Lincoln, 125 N.H. 503, 484 A.2d 1079 (1984).
89 See, e.g., Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985).
90 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Goodman v.
Stalfort, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 889 (D.N.J. 1976) aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 564 F.2d 89 (3d
Cir. 1977).
91 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
1987]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the competing policies of compensating victims of negligence and of
making individuals responsible for their own safety. Dram shop acts pro-
tect a class of people who supposedly cannot protect themselves. How-
ever, if a person has the capacity to protect himself from the foreseeable
harm that an intoxicated person may cause, a comparative negligence




In Buckley v. Pirolo, the Supreme Court of New Jersey properly ap-
plied that state's Comparative Negligence Act to a dram shop case. The
court allowed the defendant tavern owners to assert a contributory negli-
gence defense of voluntary assumption of the risk. This application di-
minished, but did not bar, the plaintiff's recovery. The court's actions
did not defeat the purpose of either the Comparative Negligence Act or
of the dram shop rule because the tavern was only allowed to assert the
defense against individuals who were capable of protecting themselves.
Other states that have adopted dram shop acts should not view the
Buckley decision as an erosion of the strict liability rationale underlying
those acts. Strict and absolute liability is only breached in situations
where the plaintiff has voluntarily encountered a known risk.
Further, state courts can reconcile the legislative intent behind com-
parative negligence statutes with the public policy underlying dram shop
rules. When in conflict, the policy underlying dram shop rules should
prevail because of the state's overriding purpose of making it easier for
plaintiffs to recover damages in negligence actions.
Suzette M. Nanovic
92 The Buckley court summarized this position in the following manner:
If a person has the capacity to protect himself from potential harm [that] an intoxicated
patron may foreseeably cause, then he must act as a reasonable, prudent person. The pole-
star is the capacity of the person seeking to recover damages to engage in self-protective
measures. Where the patron has such capacity, we see no conflict between our comparative
negligence law and the important public policy considerations underlying our dram shop
rule.
101 N.J. at 77, 500 A.2d at 708.
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